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Free Speech
Kathleen M. Sullivan*
Last year was a very big year for freedom of speech in the Roberts
Court---or more precisely, it was a big year with respect to some kinds of
speech cases but not others. To tell you about freedom of speech in the
Roberts Court so far, let me first divide the cases by scorecard. I will begin
with the cases in which speakers won their challenges, vindicating a First
Amendment interest against a government regulation. Then, turning to the
other side of the scorecard, I will talk about cases where the speaker lost.
The biggest win for speakers last Term was FEC v. Wisconsin Right to
Life,1 which involved a free speech challenge to some aspects of the
McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform Act. 2 Ultimately, the Court
invalidated the electioneering provisions of the Act as applied to broadcast
issue advertisements by nonprofit advocacy groups.
Of the three biggest losses for speakers in the Roberts Court so far, the
first is the case of Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and InstitutionalRights
("FAIR ).3 This case involved a challenge by a coalition of law faculties
against the Secretary of Defense with respect to the so-called Solomon
Amendment, 4 which restricts federal funding for any university that
excludes military recruiters from its career
placement process, even if on
5
grounds of its anti-discrimination policy.
The second was a case called Garcetti v. Ceballos.6 This is a case in
which a public employee in the Los Angeles District Attorney's office lost
a free speech challenge to a demotion he suffered, because he reported what
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1. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2652 (2007).
2. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform
Act), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) [hereinafter McCain-Feingold Act].
3. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
4. Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. § 983 (1996).
5. Id. at § 983(b) ("No funds... may be provided.., to an institution of higher education.., if
the Secretary of Defense determines that the institution ...has a policy or practice ... that prohibits,
or in effect prevents ...military recruiting ....
); see also Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 51.

6. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006).

he thought were certain false affidavits and police misconduct underlying a
search warrant. 7
The third case in which the speaker lost, Morse v. Frederick,8 is one in
which your own Dean Ken Starr successfully litigated on behalf of the
school district of Juneau, Alaska, and high school principal Deborah Morse.
In this case, young Mr. Frederick, a public high school student, was found to
have no right to unfurl a fourteen-foot
banner displaying those immortal
9
words, "Bong Hits 4 Jesus."
Why did the speaker win in Wisconsin Right to Life? Conversely, why
did the speaker lose when universities receiving public funds tried to exclude
military recruiters, when a public employee in a prosecutor's office tried to
expose police false witness, and when a high school student tried to speak in
his own unique and original way in a Juneau, Alaska public school?
We will begin with Wisconsin Right to Life. This decision signaled a
stunning turnaround from the Rehnquist Court to the Roberts Court with
respect to freedom of speech in the campaign finance context. Only a few
years ago, a free speech challenge to the McCain-Feingold Act failed in a
case called McConnell v. FEC.10 Dean Starr, together with renowned First
Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams and myself, advocated for the speakers'
side in that case, and alas we lost our facial challenge to the Act. The socalled electioneering provisions in the McCain-Feingold Act state that,
during election season, no corporate treasury funds may be used to run any
broadcast ad that identifies a candidate by name. 11
Now this strikes me as the kind of restriction on freedom of speech that
the Framers would have been concerned about. This statute significantly
restricts political speech in the most important political medium at the most
important part of the political season-a time when people might well want
to lobby their government. After all, Congress does not shut down during
election season, unlike some governments of the world where the national
legislature goes out of session during elections. 12 In the United State, there
is a major increase in legislative activity during the months preceding our
national elections, and political air time is especially valuable and salient
during that time.
On behalf of the challengers to McCain-Feingold, we argued that, on its
face, a blackout period for broadcast ads funded from a corporate

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 1955-56.
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
Id.
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
Id. at 323.
One example of this type of recess can be found in the system of British Parliament. See

HOUSE OF COMMONS INFORMATION OFFICE, PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2 (2007), available at

http:www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/M07.pdf.
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treasury-including the corporate treasury for nonprofit organizations, from
Wisconsin Right to Life to the American Civil Liberties Union, from the
National Rifle Association to the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force-is
unconstitutional.1 3 A nonprofit organization, we argued, should be able
under the First Amendment to run broadcast ads that name a candidate
during an election season.14
In McConnell, the Rehnquist Court, with Justice O'Connor providing
the decisive vote, held that there is no First Amendment invalidity in that
law on its face. 15 There may be ads, the Court reasoned, in which what
looks like a lobbying ad is really an attempt to support or defeat a
candidate-so that the ad amounts to a de facto candidate contribution that
the government may regulate. In Congress's and the Court's view, you may
be saying, "Senator Feingold, please stop filibustering those judicial
candidates," but what you are really saying-hint-hint, nudge-nudge, winkwink-is, "Voter-defeat Senator Feingold."
In Wisconsin Right to Life, by contrast, the Court-now including
Justice Alito in place of Justice O'Connor-sided with the speaker in a free
speech challenge to the McCain-Feingold Act's electioneering provisions. 16
By a vote of five-to-four, the Court held that, as applied to certain ads that
do have a reasonable purpose other than just advocating the election or
defeat of a candidate, there is a First Amendment right to be free of this
restriction on expenditures.' 7 Yes, Wisconsin Right to Life can run that ad
about Senator Feingold.
What changed? Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court over
strenuous dissent, suqgested that the Court was distinguishing McConnell
and not overruling it.
Justice Scalia was incensed. In a concurrence, he
contended that this was "faux judicial restraint" and suggested that the Court
should just overrule McConnell outright.19 While the Court did not overrule
McConnell, it did indicate very clearly that there are now five Justices on the
Supreme Court who favor strong First Amendment limits on campaign
finance regulation.
The WRTL majority suggested that there is an

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Alito,

See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190.
Id. at209-10.
Id. at 95-96.
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2007).
Id. at 2669.
Id. at 2670 n.8.
Id. at 2683 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the judgment of the Court, which received the vote of Justice
as well as the votes of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 2674 (Alito, J.,
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important free speech right that should limit the power of government to
restrict speech expressed through funding of advocacy groups during
election time. Justice Alito, unlike his predecessor Justice O'Connor, sided
with Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, 2 1 who have long said that
campaign finance regulation strikes at the heart of the First Amendment and
ought to be subject to stricter First Amendment limits. 22 This is a significant
switch.
Now let us turn to the cases where the speakers lost. In Rumsfeld v.
FAIR, the Court ruled unanimously against the claim that the Solomon
Amendment infringed any free speech rights.2 3 The plaintiff law school
faculties argued that they had a First Amendment right to express, through
their on-campus career services interviewing policy, their view that there
should be no discrimination in hiring on the basis of sexual orientation or
other factors that are unrelated to merit. 24 In their view, they should not lose
funding for excluding military employers who discriminate in violation of
their policy.
This claim raises an important and interesting question under the socalled doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which asks whether the
government may bribe you to give up the same free speech rights it could
May the government say, "If we're going to
not coerce you to forego.
give Pepperdine funding for certain scientific research, we may also tell
Pepperdine how to run its placement office," or "how to run its teaching," or
"how to run its research?"
Had the Court found that career services was like teaching or
research-that is, that any speech was being limited here-it might well
have faced a much more difficult question as to whether the government was
impermissibly coercing university faculties into giving up their free speech
rights by threatening to withhold federal funds. But the Court never reached
that unconstitutional conditions question. Instead, Chief Justice Roberts cut
was inhibited or
that argument off at the pass by saying that no speech
26
coerced by the Solomon Amendment in the first place.
concurring); id. at 2674-87 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by
Kennedy & Thomas, JJ.)
21. Id. at 2674 (Alito, J., concurring).
22. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 287 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment,
dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and joined in part by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.) (noting
that the majority opinion regarding campaign finance "replaces discrete and respected First
Amendment principles with new, amorphous, and unsound rules, rules which dismantle basic
protections for speech").
23. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 47 (2006). The
Court ruled unanimously, voting eight-zero, with Justice Alito taking no part in the consideration or
decision of the case. Id.
24. Id. at 55.
25. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).
26. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62.
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Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts held that the Solomon
Amendment did not inhibit freedom of speech because universities remained
free to say anything they wished even if military recruiters used their
placement services. 27 They could noisily protest JAG recruiters. They
could vocally urge recruitment of gay students. These rights were not being
abridged. The Chief Justice also suggested that faculties were not forced
into any expressive association with the JAG Corps recruiters who are on
campus only for a brief, limited time. With no First Amendment right
implicated at the threshold, FAIR lost its case.28
In the second case, Mr. Ceballos, a public prosecutor, also lost his free
speech claim against his boss, the District Attorney of Los Angeles. He
claimed a free speech right to report misconduct on the job-specifically, a
falsified police affidavit that he thought should have been an object of his
boss's attention. 29 In an opinion by Justice Kennedy-normally a friend of
First Amendment claims, including some in the public employment
area-the Court held that Mr. Ceballos enjoyed no heightened protection for
his free speech rights when speaking as a public employee within the scope
of his official duties. 30 Here, Ceballos was the calendar deputy in the
prosecutor's
office, and his access to the evidence was part of his official
31
duties.
In the Court's view, therefore, Mr. Ceballos's speech was more like an
unprotected internal rebellion against the boss, and less like protected speech
in his capacity as a public citizen. 32 In prior cases like Pickering,33 the
Court had held that public employees are protected when speaking as public
citizens on matters of public affairs. 34 Other decisions, by contrast, had
denied such protection to public employee speech that amounted to a
rebellion against the boss. 35 Ceballos further extended the "no rebellion
against the boss" line of public employee speech cases to a situation more
closely resembling classic whistle-blowing.
The third speaker to lose a free speech claim last Term came in the
decision of Morse v. Frederick. In this case, a school district and its

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 69-70.
Id.
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1951 (2006).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 574.
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).

principal were sued by a student who was disciplined for putting up a banner
saying, "Bong Hits 4 Jesus." 36 The Court had not had a student speech case
for over twenty years, but it had previously developed two lines of free
speech cases. The brilliance of Dean Starr's presentation for the school
district was to thread the needle between these two lines of cases.
In one line of cases, the Court had previously said that student speech
rights are protected. For example, in Tinker v. Des Moines, some students
wore black arm bands to class to protest the Vietnam War. 37 The Court said
38
they had a right to do that as long as they caused no material disruption.
The famous line was, "[S]tudents [do not] shed their right to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 39 Under the Tinker line of
cases, Mr. Frederick argued he was entitled to unfurl a banner saying, "Bong
Hits 4 Jesus," expressing whatever message he had in mind.40
On the other hand, school districts had previously prevailed on free
speech claims by students when they could say that the student was
interfering with the school's own curriculum or sense of educational
appropriateness. For example, in Bethel School District v. Fraser,the Court
had denied First Amendment protection to a student who made sexual
remarks in a mandatory school assembly, holding that such speech may be
restricted •as -pedagogically
inappropriate and contrary to the school's
•
41
educational mission.
Further, in Hazelwood School Districtv. Kuhlmeier,
the Court upheld a school district's authority to limit stories about teenage
abortion and divorced parents in the school newspaper-a publication
prepared by the school's journalism class.42 In that case, the Court ruled
that a school is allowed to define its educational mission 43and to restrict
students' speech that interferes with that educational mission.
In arguing on behalf of the Juneau school district, Dean Starr avoided
emphasis on the "educational mission" line of argument, presumably
because one of the new Justices on the Court, Justice Alito, had already
indicated during his days on the Third Circuit that he did not like the
idea of school districts necessarily having the chance to say, "Our
educational mission means you can't wear that T-shirt against gay

36. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622-23 (2007).
37. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,504, 511 (1969).

38. Id.at 504.
39. Id. at 506.
40. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623.
41. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 676 (1986) (holding that school

prohibition of vulgar terms is proper considering the school's role in inculcating values and
protecting minors).
42. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 261 (1988) (holding school paper that
was part of curriculum not subject to indiscriminate student use).
43. Id. at 266 (citing Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683, 685).
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44
marriage," or "You can't wear that T-shirt that has Bible verses on it."
In other words, Justice Alito did not like the idea that a school district gets to
define its mission broadly and that no student speech is allowed if it
interferes with that mission. a
If Dean Starr had argued too broad a
proposition about students' lack of freedom in the school arena, he might
have lost Justice Alito's vote.
So he emphasized instead the unique nature of drug-related speech,
arguing that, when schools have a no-drug policy, an anti-drug policy, or a
zero-tolerance policy, and when drug abuse is a major problem that schools
have to grapple with, student speech reasonably thought to advocate illegal
drug use may be barred. If you interpret "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" as being promarijuana use, then Mr. Frederick interfered with the narrow and specific
educational mission of suppression of drug use. Indeed, Dean Starr's
litigation strategy was so effective that it became the basis for Chief Justice
Roberts' opinion for the Court.
Reviewing this scorecard for the speech cases, some observers might
say, "I get it. The conservative speakers win, and the liberal speakers lose.
If you're criticizing policemen's conduct, advocating marijuana use, or
fighting JAG Corps discrimination against gay and lesbian service members,
you will lose your speech claim. But if you're Wisconsin Right to Life, you
will win it." In my view, that observation, while tempting, would be wrong.
A different and more helpful way of describing what distinguishes the
winning case from the losing case would be this: speakers prevail when they
are speaking with their own funds or other private resources, but speakers
lose when they seek to retain the benefit of government funding, despite
their disfavored speech. A speaker loses when he says, "I'd like to keep my
job even though I'm saying something the government doesn't like," or "I'd
like to get my scheduled funding even though I'm saying something the
government doesn't like," or "I'd like to get my free universal public
education even though I'm saying something the govemment doesn't like."
In other words, the Roberts Court has revealed that it is not so friendly to
free speech claims by those who are dependent on government largesse or
who benefit from a government privilege such as public funds, public jobs,
or public education.
In this respect, Chief Justice Roberts may be following the lead of Chief
Justice Rehnquist, his former mentor and boss, who took the view that one
who takes a government handout has no free speech right to complain about

44. See generally Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
45. Id. at 216-217

the strings attached. For example, in a decision holding that the FCC could
not limit editorializing by publicly funded broadcasting stations,46 Chief
Justice Rehnquist dissented, suggesting that this was like saying that the
"Big Bad Wolf' had taken food away from "Little Red Riding Hood"
without acknowledging that the big bad wolf put all of the food in Little Red
Riding Hood's picnic basket.47 The late Chief Justice's position here
recalled that of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who once said, "[You] may
have a ...right
to talk politics, but . . .[you don't have a] right to be a
48

policeman.
In sum, the key to understanding the pattern of free speech cases in the
Roberts Court lies not in a distinction between speakers espousing
conservative or liberal causes, but rather in a distinction between speakers
who speak with private resources and speakers who depend upon
government largesse. The speech scorecard in the Roberts Court so far
suggests alignment with the Rehnquist and Holmes position. Recipients of
public funds, public employment, or public education receive less protection
in the Roberts Court than they would have received from prior Courts.
While prior Courts suggested that acceptance of a government privilege does
not negate the recipient's free speech rights, the Roberts Court has given
government broad latitude to sanction speakers who try to bite the hand that
feeds them. By contrast, the Roberts Court has given robust free speech
protection to speakers who, like Wisconsin Right to Life, amass and expend
their own private resources. Thus, while the Roberts Court has in some
striking ways championed free speech rights, it has also retrenched from
some protections for speech that had been upheld since the Warren Court.

46. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984)
47. Id. at 402-03 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
48. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (holding that a
policeman who was fired for spending too much time talking about political candidates had no First
Amendment right to complain).
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